Mining in Malaya, 1900–1941: Polluters did not pay - Articles

Mining in Malaya, 1900–1941: Polluters did not pay

Dr Cher Hui Yun, Postdoctoral Fellow, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore¹

Malaya’s early 20th century thriving mining industry extracted and exported tin, gold, and iron to global markets in the industrialized world. Tin and gold extraction were heavily concentrated in the Federated Malay States of Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang, while iron was mined in Johor, Kelantan, and Terengganu. Foreign investors largely controlled the interests of Malaya’s early 20th century mining industry—for tin, generally Straits Settlements Chinese and British; for gold, mainly Australian; and for iron, predominantly Japanese. The huge revenues generated by these natural resource exports, especially from tin, brought development to the states and riches to investors, with most of the profits remitted overseas. But their extraction came with significant ecological impacts and social costs.

Mineral extraction left behind huge amounts of tailings—the material left over after extracting the ore from the rock. These waste materials ran into rivers and raised the height of riverbeds, posing environmental risks such as river pollution, sedimentation, soil erosion, and heightened potential for flooding—the last of which was also exacerbated by large-scale clearance of natural forests to make way for rubber plantations, coupled with the felling of hardwood trees for use in tin smelting. With the Great Flood of 1926, which severely impacted the Federated Malay States and the East Coast states, large-scale mining companies were compelled to seek British colonial regulatory intervention and supportive measures (Kathirithamby-Wells, 2005).

The Federated Malay States Chamber of Mines eventually urged the colonial authorities to implement mitigation strategies. Shortcomings in technical capacity, administrative conflicts, and resistance from some mining companies hindered, however, the effectiveness of measures taken. Instead of curtailing mineral extraction, the colonial authorities adopted an accomadative approach that enabled large-scale production of mining waste. This approach had the effect of normalizing the relocation of tailings and thus legitimized mass polluters, reflecting the prioritization of industrial interests over environmental stewardship.

This article explores how mining companies negotiated with the colonial authorities to address concerns about mining tailings and evaluates the effectiveness of the strategies implemented. It further analyses the rationales for the measures adopted, highlighting how they shaped governance norms and practices related to mechanisms for coping with mining waste.

Uncontrolled mining waste as a catalyst for action, 1900–1914

The first 15 years of the 20th century were a boom period for Malaya’s natural resource exports, especially of tin and rubber. Optimizing tin-mining production, however, faced challenges from uncontrolled tailings. The accumulation of silt and mining waste clogged rivers, altered their courses, reduced water retention, and eroded riverbanks (Fermor, 1939, pp. 146–147). As the risks from flooding in mines rose, in 1915 the Federated Malay States Chamber of Mines, established the previous year, began mobilizing collective efforts to pressure the colonial government for action.

Federated Malay States Chamber of Mines and colonial mitigation, 1915–1926

The Chamber of Mines, representing over 200 large European tin enterprises and influential Chinese tin towkays (Federated Malay States, various years), voiced concerns about the damaging impact of overflowing tailings on their tin production (Malaya Tribune, 1915, p. 4). Previous colonial government investigations that looked into challenges in the disposal of silt and tailings and the effectiveness of existing regulatory mechanisms, such as the Silting Commission (1902) and Tailings Commission (1904), failed owing to poor planning and inadequate execution. Responding to mounting pressure from the Chamber of Mines, the colonial-backed Lemon Mining Commission of 1918, led by A. H. Lemon, British Resident of Negeri Sembilan, attempted to reconcile colonial mining interests for increased production with tailings-risk mitigation. Limited regulatory enforcement and maximizing tin production during World War I had, however, weakened any focus on curbing tailings.

Tensions between the colonial government and the Chamber of Mines escalated as the latter feared a repeat in flood-prone mines in the Kinta Valley, Perak and in Selangor, similar to the late 19th century tailings-laden flooding disaster in Kuala Kubu Lama, Selangor, which destroyed the town.² The Chamber of Mines called a formal meeting on 26 September 1919 to urge the government to implement remedial measures, rather than mere investigative commissions (The Straits Echo, 1919, p. 1941). Examples of remedies sought were the construction of dams to contain tailings from mines (Malaya Tribune, 1919, p. 2). The Chamber of Mines also called for the government to assume the financial burden of mitigation, arguing that infrastructure such as dams, spillways, dredging equipment, and their maintenance were too costly for mining companies alone.

An example of the spillway of a tailings dam
Source: Greig, 1924, p. 31.

Within two months, on 25 November 1919, the Federal Council initiated an engineer-led commission both to address concerns and appease tin producers. This effort was bolstered by the Dupuis Commission of 1921, led by C. E. Dupuis, a distinguished engineer previously based in Sri Lanka, appointed by the Federated Malay States government, who proposed stricter controls on silt emissions and dumping practices (Pinang Gazette and Straits Chronicle, 1922, p. 7). The Dupuis report highlighted the administration’s conservationist approach to tackling the tailings issue (The Straits Budget, 1922, p. 7). Despite its scientific rigour, the Dupuis Commission’s recommendations faced strong opposition from mining companies, which perceived that they would harm their industrial interests, which led them to prevent their implementation. This was yet another example of an ineffective commission outcome (Pinang Gazette and Straits Chronicle, 1925, p. 6).

The Great Flood of 1926 accentuated the inadequacies of colonial ecological management, such as tailings-induced flooding, and caused widespread and catastrophic devastation to mines, communities, agricultural crops, and infrastructure (Winstedt, 1927; Williamson, 2016).³ Heightened worry among members of the Chamber of Mines about the impact of flooding on tin production pushed them to shift their orientation of mitigation measures, and led to mining-company representatives’ appointment on and integration in governance committees, and to the adoption of an ‘accomodative approach’ in handling mining-waste risks, that is, managing tailings through scientific and man-made solutions. This marked a crucial turning point in the management of mining waste in Malaya —from a conservationist to an accomodative focus.

Legalizing mass tailings through a accommodative approach, 1927–1941

From the mid-1920s, the federal government adopted an industrial accommodative approach through various programmes for the control, rehabilitation, and treatment of tailings (Pinang Gazette and Straits Chronicle, 1927, p. 5; The Straits Echo, 1927, p. 923). This approach began with a federal conference in Ipoh in July 1927 and culminated in the creation of a Federal Commission in December (The Straits Echo, 1927, p. 923). The Federal Commission formed an Advisory Board comprising the Chamber of Mines, the Department of Mines, and the Department of Irrigation (The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, 1927, p. 6).⁴ It aimed to address river maintenance, the feasibility of dredging, and tailings management techniques (Pinang Gazette and Straits Chronicle, 1928, p. 5). The Federal Commission’s proposals—including the establishment of a River Commission in 1928—led to the introduction of artificial irrigation techniques, including canalization, flood embankments, and silt-retention reservoirs, to manage mining-induced siltation (Malaya Tribune, 1927a, p. 2). These measures were the outcome of the industrial approach.

Relocating pollution: controversial artificialization of irrigation

In the first rationale, the River Commission of 1928 proposed an artificial irrigation network to relocate tailings waste rather than reduce or eliminate it (The Straits Budget, 1928, p. 9). The irrigation system, executed by two groups of engineers, began at Bentong, Pahang, as a pilot site, as it faced severe bottlenecks caused by the state’s tailings-laden rivers (Sungai Perting, Sungai Bentong, and Sungai Repas), overflowing from elevated altitudes following the 1926 flood (Colonial Office, 1932). After the clearance of floodwater channels and the removal of obstructions, two-phase retention measures were implemented (Colonial Office, 1929) (see below).

Overflowing silting before (left) and after (right) the river training
Source: Colonial Office, 1932.

During the experimental phase, Bentong’s rivers retained 69,193 cubic metres of silt, with one-third accumulating in riverbeds, despite ongoing clearing and fencing (Colonial Office, 1932). The monsoon rains of 1930–1931 saw silting double, exposing the inefficiency of retention facilities (Drainage and Irrigation Department, Malaya, 1938). These systems merely contained silt and restricted its flow rather than eliminating it. Silting became overwhelming when a high influx of tailings swept down from hillside mining activities in Pahang’s upper valleys of Repas, Perting, and Chamang during rainfall. Silt volumes reached a staggering 519,897 cubic metres in 1936 (Federated Malay States, 1936), and 583,970 cubic metres in 1937, surpassing previous records (Drainage and Irrigation Department, Malaya, 1938).

Efforts to address rising silt levels continued in an expansion phase in 1937, such as additional spillway retention at Perting Dam designed to accommodate an additional storage capacity of 76.5 million cubic metres for 2–4 years capacity (see illustration). Yet this territorial expansion proved inefficient in capturing the high proportion of the rapidly escalating silt production. For instance, the volume of silt recovered in 1928 before the project was 662,104 cubic metres, but declined to only 77,985 cubic metres by 1938 (Drainage and Irrigation Department, Malaya, 1938). Despite expansion and upgrading, neither silt retention nor improvements in waste management materialized, revealing these measures’ systemic limitations.

Proposed extension of silt retention areas at Bentong
Source: Drainage and Irrigation Department, Malaya, 1939.

Three critical factors rendered the infrastructure irrigation interventions controversial and ineffective. First, technical flaws and poor maintenance plagued the projects. The structures were poorly suited to hilly regions, where dams frequently failed to hold up tailings effectively (Greig, 1924, pp. 47–48). Maintenance deficiencies and a lack of skilled technicians further reduced the irrigation systems’ functioning. Second, these projects disregarded the agricultural and forestry sectors, encroaching on paddy fields and fostering discontent among smallholder agriculturists (Pinang Gazette and Straits Chronicle, 1927, p. 5). Simultaneously, unregulated deforestation driven by mining and plantation expansion exacerbated stream degradation, flooding, and silting (Short and Jackson, 1971). Third, enforcement gaps led mining companies to adopt cost-effective but flawed practices, such as spreading tailings across flood channels or disposing of them in old mines. These methods accelerated river pollution at a rate that outpaced the irrigation model’s ability to mitigate waste.⁵

Administrative conflicts compounded these issues. The inclusion of the Chamber of Mines in the River Commission in 1928 led to conflicts with the Department of Public Works over river diversion and irrigation plans. These conflicts arose because the new implementation procedures, advocated by the latter, set more stringent standards, resulting in approval delays and costly modifications for mining companies (The Straits Budget, 1929, p. 2). Conflicts escalated when authority over river management shifted from the Mines Department to the Department of Public Works (hydraulic branch) in the same year. This fuelled a new wave of resistance by the Chamber of Mines, which criticized the inefficiency and costs of additional obligations, such as constructing riverbank structures and channels to divert rivers (Malaya Tribune, 1927b, p. 5). These shortcomings exposed the fundamental limitations of irrigation schemes, which caused widespread silt-filled riverbeds and a severe loss of ecological, functional, and aesthetic values in affected rivers (Drainage and Irrigation Department, Malaya, 1939). Interventions, such as deepening riverbeds and altering soil gradients, often worsened tailings’ piling issues and disrupted rivers’ ecosystems over time (The Straits Budget, 1928, p. 9).

Protecting polluters: legalizing and normalizing mass pollution

The second rationale of colonial measures to regulate mining waste was to protect large-scale tin producers through biased regulations and protectionist norms. The Mining Enactments of 1928 and 1935 exemplified this, establishing regulatory standards that effectively legalized extensive tailings disposal. Companies were allowed to discharge high silt concentrations into rivers—13,710 parts per million (ppm) for regular rivers and 668 ppm for agricultural-irrigated rivers.⁶ This leniency permitted mining companies to legally discharge substantial amounts of tailings into rivers under the guise of regulation. Some schemes permitted even higher limits. For instance, the Simpang Ampat–slimed filling scheme in Ipoh, Perak, permitted effluent discharges with silt concentrations of up to 68,500 ppm—five times the regulatory standard (Fermor, 1939, p. 155).

In addition, a more lax industrial norm reduced the regulatory standard: compliance was based not on precise measurements but on the visible discolouration of effluents, regardless of volume (Greig, 1924, pp. 47–48). This loophole exempted mining companies from accountability for tailings surpassing the regulatory limits. Another norm allowed for the disposal of finer silt, assuming that coarser silt would remain in retention systems. Companies often bypassed this distinction of size, however, releasing coarser silt into rivers to extend the operational lifespan of existing retention dams (Fermor, 1939, p. 164; Greig, 1924, pp. 47–48). Further, the industrial framework incentivized polluters by promoting tailings use to fill abandoned mining pits under the pretext of ‘land reconditioning’ (Fermor, 1939, p. 155). This practice benefited mining operators as they did not need to search for new land for disposal, build new retention dams, or even reduce tailings disposal.⁷

By relaxing thresholds and embedding leniency into industrial practices, the approach epitomized an industrialist protectionist model that normalized extensive tailings pollution and legitimized polluters. Driven by economic imperatives and intensive extraction and export demand until World War II, this model was rationalized as ‘a small price to pay’ compared with the substantial revenues derived from mining activities (Fermor, 1939, p. 155). As a result, it perpetuated unchecked industrial exploitation practices while legitimizing environmental degradation from tailings as an industrial norm and as a cost of colonial economic priorities.

Piles of slime next to a Malayan dredge
Source: De Villa, 1935.

Conclusion

The colonial governance of mining waste offers crucial reflections on environmental management challenges. The post-1926 shift, embodied by the River Commission of 1928 and its irrigation schemes, revealed technical, sectoral, and administrative shortcomings. The Federated Malay States Chamber of Mines emerged as an agent of change, engaging at colonial government level in a new direction of measures—an industrial accommodative approach. Despite the promise of new remedial measures and some noble efforts by some stakeholders, the adoption of industrial rationales—relocating tailings and protecting polluters—prioritized economic and colonial interests over environmental integrity. By embedding industrial interests in governance, this model not only exacerbated ecological vulnerabilities but also entrenched the dominance of industrialists’ objectives when tackling mining risks and pollution. And, of course, there are other lasting environmental impacts of tailings, including the toxic chemicals that they produce, the loss of biodiversity, and soil erosion. Even to the present, polluters leave costs unpaid.

Further reading:

Colonial Office. 1929. CO 717/63/13. Federated Malay States: Original Correspondences. Improvement and Maintenance of Rivers. Progress report by Sydney Smith, the Director of Public Works of Federated Malay States, dated 24 January 1929. Kew, UK: The National Archives.

________ 1932. CO 717/91/7. Federated Malay States: Original Correspondences. Improvement and Maintenance of Rivers. Kew, UK: The National Archives.

De Villa, E. M. 1935. The Study of Mines in China, Indochina, and Malaya. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Daily Press, Limited.

Drainage and Irrigation Department, Malaya. 1938. Annual Report of the Drainage and Irrigation Department. Malaysia: Arkib Negara Malaysia.

________ 1939. Annual Report of the Drainage and Irrigation Department.

Federated Malay States (various years). Chamber of Mines Year Book. Perak: Federated Malay States Chamber of Mines, Inc.

________ 1936. Annual Report of Pahang.

Fermor, L. L. 1939. Report upon the Mining Industry of Malaya. Kuala Lumpur: Federated Malay States Government Press.

Greig, G. E. 1924. Mining in Malaya. London: Malay States Information Agency.

Kathirithamby-Wells, J. 2005. Nature and Nation: Forests and Development in Peninsular Malaysia. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press.

Malaya Tribune. 1915. ‘The Miners and the Government’. 4 January, p. 4.

________ 1919. ‘Federated Malay States Mines’. 1 August, p. 2.

________ 1927a. ‘Flood Prevention’. 11 March, p. 5.

________ 1927b. ‘Engineers of Malaya’. 18 March, p. 2.

Pinang Gazette and Straits Chronicle. 1922. ‘River Improvement in Malaya’. 4 April, p. 7.

________ 1925. ‘The Uncontrolled Kinta’. 3 November, p. 6.

________ 1927. ‘Federal Council’. 3 March, p. 5.

________ 1928. ‘Federal Council Meeting at Kuala Lumpur’. 5 November, p. 5.

Short, D. E. and Jackson, J. C. 1971. ‘The Origins of an Irrigation Policy in Malaya: A Review of Developments Prior to the Establishment of the Drainage and Irrigation Department’. Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 44/1, pp.78–103.

The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser. 1927. ‘Federated Malay States Chamber of Mines’. 31 May, p. 6.

The Straits Budget. 1922. ‘Federated Malay States Chamber of Mines. The Outlook for Malayan Tin. Mr. Glenister's Review.’ 31 March, p. 7.

________ 1928. ‘The Malayan Rivers: Mining Silt. Kuala Lumpur and Ipoh: Methods to Prevent Flooding’. 10 May, p. 9.

________ 1929. ‘Governor Among the Miners. Flood Problem. No Increase in Tin Duties. Co-Operation With the Government’. 11 July, p. 2.

The Straits Echo (Mail Edition). 1919. ‘Federal Council’. 26 November, p. 1941.

________ 1927. ‘The Federal Budget’. 16 November, p. 923.

Winstedt, R. O. 1927. ‘The Great Flood, 1926’. Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 5/2, pp. 295–309.

Williamson, F. 2016. ‘The “Great Flood” of 1926: Environmental Change and Post‐disaster Management in British Malaya’. Ecosystem Health and Sustainability, 2/11.

Endnotes

¹This article is based on an edited summary from my PhD awarded in 2024 by the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (INALCO), Centre Asie du Sud-Est (CASE-EHESS-CNRS), Paris.
²In this project, engineer H. I. Smail produced a report on the conditions of the Kinta River as a reference for irrigation planning; see minutes of meeting contained in Federated Malay States Malaysian Chamber of Mines, 1919.
³Pejabat Tanah Kuala Lipis, Pahang, 1927–1945, Arkib Negara Malaysia C17–07 (PT), 337-27.
⁴Advisory board members included a representative of the Chamber of Mines, four acting Federated Malay States British Residents, the Senior Warden of Mines, the Director of Agriculture, and a representative of the planting community, led by the Director of Public Works Department, Federated Malay States.
⁵Memorandum on the Bundi and Freda Mine, by Mr. C. F. S. Jameson, Johor’s Warden of Mines, dated 20 December 1937, Arkib Negara Malaysia (Terengganu branch) 1983/0005106.
⁶The limits imposed by the Mining Enactment of 1928 were directly related to water hardness—a measure of the concentration of inorganic dissolved minerals in water. Water with 0 parts per million (ppm) of dissolved solids is considered drinkable, that with 100 ppm is classified as hard water, while that with 400 ppm contains very high levels of dissolved solids and is no longer considered safe for drinking.
⁷Correspondence from Teck Loong Mining Co to the Commissioner of Lands and Mines, dated 14 August 1941, Arkib Negara Malaysia (Terengganu branch) 1983/0005106.